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Abstract: How  can  economic  policies  lead  us  to  greater  wealth,  welfare and  happiness?  There is  no  bigger
question in economics. The answer lies in correct economic theories that capture the causality linking policies to
outcomes. Economic theories are a dime a dozen – we have more theories than we have human beings. The key
need to answer any economic question lies in our ability to validate theories. Do we live in an Austrian world? In a
Keynesian world? A world of rational expectations? This White Paper proposes that major advances in simulating
virtual economies is possible and can form the basis for rapid and accurate assessment of current and future
economic models. I make general proposals for developing infrastructure, as well as presenting specific ideas about
the nature of models of sophisticated expectations that are needed to allow artificial agents to mimic the behavior of
real human beings.Validation by Virtual Economies – David K. Levine
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One of the most essential needs for developing better economic theories and policy prescriptions are
improved methods of validating theories. Originally economics depended on field data gathered from surveys. The
introduction of laboratory experiments added a new dimension: a good theory ought to be able to predict outcomes in
the artificial world of the laboratory. Modern economics has extended this in two directions: to field experiments,
keeping many of the controls of laboratory experiments, while conducting experiments in more natural environments,
and  through  internet  experiments,  extending  the  size  and  scope  of  the  populations  used  in  experiments.  The
importance of these innovations is great, and have been discussed in depth by List, among others. Not only is it
easier, faster, and more practical to validate theories, but through greater control, issues of causality that are difficult
to analyze with field data can be addressed. On the other hand, laboratory, field and internet experiments all have
important  limitations.  Even  the  largest  internet  experiment  is  orders  of  magnitudes  smaller  than  a  small  real
economy: thousands of subjects rather than millions of real decision makers. Experiments are faster than waiting for
new data to arrive, but are still time-consuming – the more so with the National Institute of Health trying to apply
inappropriate medical ethics to harmless economics experiments. Subjects are expensive to pay, especially in large
scale experiments. Finally, control in experiments is still and necessarily imperfect. In particular, it is not possible to
control for either risk aversion or social preferences.
An alternative method of validating theories is through the use of entirely artificial economies. To give an
example, imagine a virtual world – something like Second Life, say – populated by virtual robots designed to mimic
human behavior. A good theory ought to be able to predict outcomes in such a virtual world. Moreover, such an
environment  would  offer  enormous  advantages:  complete  control –  for  example,  over  risk  aversion  and  social
preferences; independence from well-meant but irrelevant human subjects “protections”; and great speed in creating
economies and validating theories. If we were to look at the physical sciences, we would see the large computer
models used in testing nuclear weapons as a possible analogy. In the economic setting the great advantage of such
artificial economies is the ability to deal with heterogeneity, with small frictions, and with expectations that are
backward looking rather than determined in equilibrium. These are difficult or impractical to combine in existing
calibrations or Monte Carlo simulations.
The  notion  of virtual  economies is  not  new:  the  general  concept  has  become known  as  agent-based
modeling. Yet, despite three decades of effort, agent-based models are largely limited to studying phenomena such
as traffic patterns. In economics, the most influential work has been that of Nelson and Winter examining the
evolution of growth and change. Yet this work has not had a substantial impact on our understanding of economics.
The problematic aspect of agent-based modeling has been the focus on frameworks for agents interacting – the
development of languages such as SWARM or Cybele – and the fact that agents are limited to following simple
heuristic decision rules. Agent-based models are interesting from the perspective of modeling order arising from the
interaction of many simple decision rules – along the lines of Becker’s observation  that  demand curves  slope
downwards when people choose randomly along the budget line. These models are also useful in constructing
examples to illustrate special points. However, existing agent-based models are too primitive to be used either for
evaluating economic policies or for validating economic theories.
Although some argue that people are simple-minded and follow simple rules, the practical problem is that
people are far better learners and vastly more sophisticated than existing computer models. Simple rules are not a
good representation – for example – of how stock market traders operate. What is needed are agents who use
sophisticated algorithms. Real people in the laboratory and the field are able to recognize sophisticated patterns and
anticipate future events. One of the simplest examples is the learning that takes place in the laboratory when
subjects discover the idea of dominated strategies.Validation by Virtual Economies – David K. Levine
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The key to developing useful virtual economies is modeling inferences about causality. A useful place to
start thinking about the issues is with Sargent’s The Conquest of American Inflation and the follow on papers with
Cogley.  There  the  Federal  Reserve  is  modeled  as  a  sophisticated  Bayesian  learner  equipped  with  powerful
econometric methods and sophisticated intertemporal preferences – but limited to the data on hand.  Dynamic
Bayesian optimization including the use of policy experiments enables the Fed to learn the true relationship between
unemployment and inflation leading over time to superior monetary policy. The model is validated against the last 50
years of data on monetary policy, inflation and unemployment.
Notice that in the Sargent-Cogley world, the decision problem is narrowly circumscribed: how best to choose
the rate of monetary expansion. The incoming data is also circumscribed, and issues such as learning by analogy do
not arise. Moreover, they assume one of the underlying models is correct: in an environment where none of the
underlying models are correct, Bayesian methods are not so useful.
A useful framework for thinking about this problem is the computer science problem that underlies boosting:
the choice among experts. A carefully chosen randomization strategy giving greater weight to experts with better
track records can do as well asymptotically as the best expert – this is true even when all the experts are wrong. The
framework can be extended to dynamic decision making by putting time into blocks – a technique often used in
analyzing repeated games. If the block is long enough the payoff is approximately the same as the infinite present
value. While this may be a useful benchmark for learning about causality, it is a weak criterion. First, blocking periods
means that the length of time taken to learn is enormous. While the evaluation of dynamic plans requires that those
plans be maintained for some period of time, there is little point in sticking with an expert when it is clear that he is
doing a poor job. Second, causality between periods is ignored. To take a simple example, imagine a repeated
Prisoners’ Dilemma game where your opponent plays tit-for-tat starting by not cooperating. An expert who says your
opponent will always cheat will lead you to cheat – and his forecasts will be correct. Of course an expert who says
you should always cooperate and your opponent will cooperate after the first period is equally correct, and you will do
much better following his advice.
If we accept the basic framework of replacing a prior over models with a probability of choice over experts it
is possible to outline the issues that need to be resolved. Experts make recommendations that can be evaluated
directly – the weak criterion for asymptotic success has already been described. They also provide suggestions of
evidence that demonstrate their ability as experts. That evidence needs to be assessed on several dimensions:
1.  Calibration – how accurate are the predictions?
2.  Precision – are the predictions vague or are they sharp? Does the expert always say “it might rain or shine
with equal probability” or does he say half the time “it will rain for sure” and half the time “it will shine for
sure.” The latter prediction is more precise.
Calibration  and  precision  are  traditional  criteria  for  model  evaluation.  However,  there  are  additional
considerations.
3.  Relevance: A molecular biologist may be able to make very accurate forecasts about the formation of
molecules  –  but  why  should  that  lead  me  to  take  his  investment  advice?  Notice  that  there  is  surely
heterogeneity  among  people  in  evaluating  the  relevance  of  forecasts:  some  may  believe  that  a  good
molecular biologist can better forecast stock prices than a bad one. Utility is directly related to relevance:
two experts may both recommend I not jump off a bridge. One may say “if you jump you will die” while theValidation by Virtual Economies – David K. Levine
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other may tell me the speed at which I will hit the water and how far my body parts will be flung. But this
additional information is of no use in decision making. Detailed information about inferior plans is not helpful.
4.  Scope: experts differ in the number of things they can forecast. It is natural to put more weight on the advice
of an expert who can predict a great many things well over one who can predict only a few things well.
Notice that this goes in the opposite direction from relevance.
5.  Ease of implementation. Some advice may be difficult to follow in practice. Here the analysis of impulsive
behavior  as  in  the  theoretical  models  of  Fudenberg  and  Levine  or  the  empirical  work  of  Cunha  and
Heckman may play a useful role.
Notice that the expert approach gets at several tricky issues. One is the issue of generalization. An expert who
makes forecasts in many domains implicitly provides a formula for generalizing results from one domain to another.
For example we may want to get at the idea that when someone learns the idea of dominated strategies they do not
merely learn not to play a dominated strategy in a particular game, but they learn not to play dominated strategies in
any game. This can be done in the expert framework by providing an expert who advises against playing dominated
strategies  in  all  games.  Second,  the  framework  deals  well  with  the  transmission  of  ideas  –  experts  can  be
communicated from one person to another – unlike the sending of messages or provision of data there is no issue of
the reliability of the information; the recipients can test the ideas implicit in the expert for themselves. However, it
deals  less  well  with  the  need  to  experiment  with  “off  the  equilibrium  path”  behavior  to  determine  the  causal
consequences because it does not tell us what is the option value of experimentation.
A large part of the advancement of the science must be the development of these and other learning
models, understanding which ones have the best theoretical properties; which ones work best in practice; and which
ones are most descriptive of actual behavior. The validation against behavior may benefit from neuro-economic
experimental methods such as that of Glimcher or Rustichini. At the extreme, efforts such as the blue-brain project
can provide additional paths of validation.
The infrastructure requirements for this project are large. The development and validation of sophisticated
agent models is only a part. To combine many agent-models into a single economy requires reliable high speed
networking  and substantial  computer  power  at  each  end,  as  well  as  thoughtful  and  well-developed  models  of
production, trade and consumption. Existing agent-based modeling frameworks may provide a starting point, but are
not equipped to handle the load that simulating an artificial economy requires. Multi-player computer games have
solved many of these problems and may provide an alternate point of departure. Second Life is one such game, but it
is a gigantic and open-ended, so not ideal for test-bedding. Smaller more controlled gaming environments such as
Capitalism II might be more suitable.
Game  environments  raise  an  important  issue.  We  cannot  reasonably  simulate  economies  since  the
beginning of time, nor the process by which people acquire information growing up and in school. So artificial agents
will need to be endowed with some knowledge of the environment they are in. Games often have artificial intelligence
agents – sometimes quite clever – but very specialized. Economics needs generalist agents, but these agents must
be equipped with reasonable initial knowledge and the ability to respond to complicated rule changes. Our robots will
neither be able to read the health-care bill; nor to understand the pronouncements by experts about what it means.
Some alternatives will need to be developed.Validation by Virtual Economies – David K. Levine
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At the human level the infrastructure requires the collaboration of economic theorists and practitioners with
computer scientists, psychologists, neuroscientists, and quite possibly computer game developers.
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